CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.553
19 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ahmad Kamal (Pakistan)

GE.90-60781/1858B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 553rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference continues today, in accordance with its programme of work, further consideration of outstanding matters. As usual, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In that connection, I am pleased to inform the Conference that, today, the heads of the delegations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms will make statements at this plenary meeting on the status of those negotiations. This is a welcome development which, I am sure, will be appreciated by all members, as this enhances the role of this Conference as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. I therefore extend a cordial welcome in our midst to Ambassadors Richard R. Burt and Yuri Nazarkin, as well as to Ambassador David Smith, who will also address us today.

I should also like to note the presence among us of the new representative of Czechoslovakia to the Conference, Ambassador Juraj Králik, who is participating in our work for the first time today. Ambassador Králik is an old Geneva hand, and it gives me pleasure to extend to him a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and pledge to him my personal co-operation and that of my own delegation.

I further wish to inform you that immediately after we have come to the end of the list of speakers today, I intend to convene, an informal meeting of the Conference to consider two requests for participation from non-members which were received last week. After the informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary meeting immediately to formalize any decisions that may have been agreed upon informally.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, you have already welcomed Ambassador Richard Burt, head of the United States delegation to the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, and Ambassador David Smith, chief United States negotiator for the defence and space talks. If I may, I would simply add that Ambassador Burt has pursued his distinguished career serving in a number of senior posts such as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and, most recently, as United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. He brings to his current position long and high-level experience in the field of nuclear arms control, as well as political, military and national security affairs in general. Ambassador Smith has worked with high distinction in defence and space matters for a good number of years, and comes to his current post here in Geneva from a senior-level position on the staff of the United States Senate. He is no stranger to these chambers, having served for more than two years on the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament during the middle 1980s.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

It is our proposal that Ambassador Burt bring the Conference up to date regarding developments, as we view them, in the United States-Soviet strategic arms reduction talks since his last briefing last August. He will be followed by Ambassador Smith, who will brief the Conference on the current status of the defence and space negotiations. The United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament is pleased to be able to offer these briefings as a part of our continuing efforts to keep the Conference abreast of progress in these important bilateral arms control discussions.

Thank you, Mr. President. With your permission, I will turn the floor over to Ambassador Burt.

Mr. BURT (United States of America): I would like to thank Ambassador Ledogar for his warm introduction. I have known Steve for a long time. He is experieneced and extremely capable, and the United States is proud to have him lead our delegation here at the CD. Indeed, his appointment to this important post was a statement of our high regard for this institution. I would also like to thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words and for the opportunity to brief the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you the greatest success during your tenure as CD President.

Once again, I am pleased to be speaking to the members of the Conference on Disarmament on the status of the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. As Steve Ledogar pointed out, Ambassador David Smith, the chief United States negotiator for the defence and space talks, is with me and will discuss those negotiations in a few moments.

Eight months ago, I came here to discuss the United States' objective in START - the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Our objective is to complete a treaty that provides for reductions in strategic offensive arms, enhances stability, and thus reduces the risk of nuclear war. I said then that, for President George Bush, nothing has higher priority than to achieve a fair and far-reaching agreement that strengthens peace.

Much has happened since my last visit to underscore these statements. First, President Bush and President Gorbachev met in Malta and committed themselves to resolving the major issues in these negotiations by their next summit meeting, which will begin 30 May in Washington. Secondly, Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met in February in Moscow, with the aim of advancing the objectives and priorities defined at Malta. With respect to START, this meeting resulted not only in a thorough exchange of views, but also in agreement in some significant areas, which I will discuss in a few moments. Thirdly, we have reached agreement with the Soviet Union on some of the trial verification measures first proposed by President Bush last June. As you may recall, last June President Bush proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union make a special effort to agree on and implement a series of practice verification measures. These measures are designed to enhance verification of a START treaty and to contribute to stategic stability. The measures will afford the sides practical experience in verification procedures. And finally, the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister met again two weeks ago

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in Washington. While there were some disappointments at these meetings, the Ministers did agree on an impressive agenda aimed at resolving a comprehensive list of issues in the START negotiations by the United States-Soviet summit.

As a result of all these factors, important progress has been made on key major issues, and the negotiations have gained unprecedented momentum. As an example of the pace of our talks, since I returned from Washington on Monday morning, I have met on seven different occasions with my distinguished and capable counterpart, Yuri Nazarkin. Now, I would like to highlight briefly some of the areas of progress as well as some of the additional issues being discussed here in Geneva.

First, while Ambassador Smith will discuss the status of the defence and space talks, let me just say that at the ministerial meeting last year in Wyoming, the Soviets made an important, positive step in the area of linkage. In February at the Moscow ministerial, the Soviets clarified their position by stating that, while it is their preference to include agreed statements to the START treaty regarding withdrawal should a party abrogate or withdraw from the ABM Treaty, it is not a pre-condition for agreement in START. This removes a fundamental obstacle to achieving and implementing a START agreement.

The issue of what comes after a START treaty has also become a key topic for Ambassador Nazarkin and me. At the Moscow meetings earlier this year, Secretary Baker and Minister Shevardnadze authorized us to begin such a dialogue. The Soviets have made proposals for such discussions - which some have begun to call "nuclear and space talks II" or NST II - although the details of what would be covered by such follow-on negotiations are unclear at this stage.

The issue of cruise missiles has proven to be a very difficult and vexing issue. The sides made great strides toward resolving the issues of both air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) at the Moscow ministerial earlier this year. These discussions continued in Geneva and at the Washington meetings last week. New problems have emerged, but I remain hopeful that the remaining technical differences on these issues can be worked out. On air-launched cruise missiles, the sides neared agreement on a package approach that includes ALCM attribution rules and provisions for distinguishing nuclear and conventional ALCMs. The issue of the ALCM range threshold is high on the list of problems that we are still working to resolve. We have also resolved important elements of the sea-launched cruise missile issue, agreeing on a politically binding declaratory approach. But such topics as the range of SLCMs and whether the declarations will cover nuclear SLCMs only or also address conventional SLCMs are still open issues, among others.

On the issue of numerical limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles and the warheads attributable to them, the sides agreed in Moscow to have such limits only for mobile ICBMs. Thus, non-deployed, silo-based ballistic missiles, non-deployed cruise missiles, and non-deployed heavy bomber weapons will not be numerically constrained. In addition, the sides further agreed on a régime governing the location and movement of all non-deployed ballistic missiles. The details of these agreements are also being negotiated in Geneva.

(Mr. Burt, United States)

Ambassador Nazarkin and I singled out for our personal attention the issue of the non-denial of telemetry data during flight tests of ballistic missiles. This is one area of verification that will determine whether START enhances our security and strategic stability by promoting transparency on both sides. While there are some significant issues remaining, we have agreed on major elements of a régime to ensure that such data will be obtainable. While these provisions will be included in the START treaty, they will be implemented at the time of treaty signature, through an exchange of letters.

I would like to report to you this morning that the sides have also made substantial progress on the issue of treaty duration. At the Washington meetings, the sides reached general agreement that the START treaty will remain in force for 15 years unless superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended by mutual agreement. We are working out the remaining details now here in Geneva.

The delegations in Geneva are also working on a host of other important, more technical issues. For example, we are engaged in active discussions concerning verification of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, phasing of our reductions, and attribution of warheads to future types of ballistic missiles.

Since round XIII began in late January, Ambassador Nazarkin and I, and our respective delegations, have been working hard to fill in the gaps in the treaty text and develop constructive ideas that will meet both countries' desires to resolve all the major issues by the June summit.

At the Washington ministerial last week, Secretary Baker and Minister Shevardnadze agreed on a list of issues which they instructed the Geneva delegations to attempt to resolve by the summit. Arguably two of the most important such topics are non-circumvention of the treaty and the details of a solid verification régime - at the core of which is on-site inspection. On the subject of non-circumvention, Ambassador Nazarkin and I are currently continuing the discussions that we addressed with our Ministers in Washington last week. I can report that the sides have made substantial progress on this issue, and that both sides have shown flexibility. A second issue is a verification régime that, both sides agree, will include a unique and unprecedented inspection régime. When historians look back at this treaty, it may well be that the single most important aspect of START was the remarkable inspection procedures that were put into place. Inspectors will visit almost every important strategic military installation of the other side. The impact of START on confidence-building and military transparency between the United States and the Soviet Union could be profound. These confidence-building and transparency effects of START, I believe, will foster better relations between our countries. Today, some 13 different types of inspections are incorporated into the START treaty.

In some cases, President Bush's trial verification measures and similar Soviet proposals have cleared away several hurdles, especially those that would prevent agreement because of a misunderstanding on operations and

(Mr. Burt, United States)

procedures for inspections. Last September, Secretary Baker and Minister Shevardnadze signed the first of these measures, an agreement on notification of major strategic exercises involving heavy bombers. In addition, we have reached agreement on other such measures. The Verification and Stability Measure for early Re-entry Vehicle Inspections and Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers are two of these steps. Under our Re-entry Vehicle Inspection proposal, for example, it was envisaged than each side would demonstrate its own proposed inspection procedures for verifying that specific types of ICBMs and SLBMs have no more warheads that the number of warheads attributed to them. In fact, the first such trial inspection will take place next week, when American and Soviet officials travel to F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming in the United States to validate procedures for counting warheads on the MX missile.

Finally, we have conducted reciprocal demonstrations of techniques for applying unique identifiers on ballistic missiles, a process referred to as tagging missiles. Experts from both of our countries met here to take part in this exercise. In essence, the "tag" on a missile will act as its fingerprint, thereby ensuring that each missile possessed by both sides can be uniquely identified.

As you can see, the United States and the Soviet Union have now implemented a series of these measures. They will substantially enhance transparency and predictability in the arms control process.

These past few months have been full of activity as both sides converge on our common goal. In my closing remarks, let me try to address the significance of the START treaty.

Clearly we are in a period of great East-West political change. Because of the impact of these changes, for some there is a tendency to believe that a START treaty has been overtaken by events. In my view, to think this is a major mistake. It is clear in our view that the American strategy of extended deterrence has had a stabilizing impact on East-West relations and world peace. The changing situation within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe undoubtedly offers important new opportunities to reduce the risk of nuclear war, but we must approach any modification of our existing strategy with a sense of constructive caution. It is our view that random changes to American security strategy and the doctrine of extended deterrence could serve to decrease stability during periods of great political change.

The START treaty will be the first arms control agreement in history to actually reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons. At the same time, the provisions of this treaty allow for a structured approach to this reduction that promotes stability. Given the rapid change in the world around us, it is very important to codify our accomplishments and the stability they provide. With this in mind, the United States approaches the upcoming summit meeting with the Soviet Union with great optimism and a sense of historical accomplishment.

Mr. SMITH (United States of America): Mr. President, I would first like to thank you for the kind words of welcome which you addressed to me, and also thank Ambassador Ledogar for his kind words of welcome. It is indeed a pleasure to be back here in the CD - I spent a number of years here and it is good to be back in a familiar surrounding with, in fact, some familiar faces. So I regard it not only as a privilege but also a great pleasure to be here with you today.

I appreciate this opportunity to share with the Conference on Disarmament our perspectives on the defence and space negotiations. My predecessor, Ambassador Cooper, spoke with you last August. Since then several positive developments have occurred, although key areas of disagreement remain.

Throughout the five-year history of the defence and space talks the United States has had a consistent objective. We seek to facilitate a co-operative transition to a more stable deterrence which relies increasingly on non-nuclear defences against strategic ballistic missiles, should they prove feasible. Today's strategic balance relies almost exclusively on nuclear offensive weapons. Advances in non-nulcear technologies now make it likely that greater reliance on advanced defences can be combined with stabilizing reductions in strategic offences to reduce further the risk of war.

To achieve these goals, the United States has a forward-looking approach in the defence and space talks. We seek to assure full testing rights for advanced defensive technologies, as allowed in the 1972 anti-ballistic missile, or ABM Treaty. We seek to free space-based ABM radars and their substitutes from outdated ABM Treaty limits. United States proposals would require serious and thorough discussions with the Soviet Union on specific measures for a co-operative transition prior to either party's future deployment of advanced defences beyond current ABM Treaty limits. United States proposals would also assure deployment rights after those talks. Finally, the United States seeks, through predictability - that is, confidence-building - measures, to avert future technological surprises by encouraging greater openness in both sides' activities in the field of strategic ballistic missile defence.

The centrepiece of the United States approach is our proposed defence and space treaty, aimed at facilitating a co-operative transition. The United States draft, updated last December, retains key understandings reached at the 1987 Washington summit and takes into account the outcome of the September 1989 Wyoming meeting of Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. At that session the Soviet Union dropped its demand for agreement on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union also dropped its linkage between signature and implementation of a START treaty and reaching a new agreement on defence and space. The United States welcomed this step.

The United States draft treaty provides for procedures whereby either party may declare its intent to deploy strategic defences by giving notice and proposing specific measures for implementing a co-operative transition. The parties would be required to conduct three years of intensive discussions of

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the proposed specific measures and the implications for strategic stability. Subsequently, unless agreed otherwise, if a party decided to commence deployments beyond those allowed by the ABM Treaty, it would have to give a further six months' notice.

This proposed mechanism offers a more stable path for deploying advanced defences than the current alternative, which is to exercise the supreme interest withdrawal provision of the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty permits a party to withdraw and deploy after only six months' notice. Our proposed new mechanism would help ensure a meaningful and timely dialogue on how to achieve a stable, co-operative transition.

The revised United States draft treaty also reflects the full rights of the parties under the ABM Treaty to develop and test advanced space-based ABM systems and components. To build confidence and prevent misperceptions about such testing, the United States offered a Space Testing Assurance in October 1988. It assures the Soviet Union that United States space-based ABM testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty could not constitute a prohibited deployment of defences. The United States pledged that only from a limited number of ABM test satellites would it conduct testing of a component of an ABM system based on other physical principles and capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile. Such testing would be to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. The number of United States ABM test satellites in orbit simultaneously will not exceed a number well short of that associated with any realistic deployed capability. To build confidence further, the United States has proposed as a predictability measure notifications for launches, tests, changes of orbits, and deorbits of ABM test satellites.

The United States has also proposed that both sides be permitted to develop, test, or deploy space-based ABM radars and their substitutes without restriction. This would avoid future definitional and verification problems likely to arise because of advancing space-based technology, and it would encourage the evolution of stabilizing space-based sensors.

Another major concept in the United States draft treaty is ensuring predictability in the development of the United States-Soviet strategic relationship in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war. This objective was agreed at the 1987 Washington summit. In 1988 the United States proposed predictability measures to implement this objective. These measures include annual exchanges of programmatic data, meetings of experts, briefings, visits to laboratories, and observations of tests in the field of strategic ballistic missile defence. These measures would be carried out on a voluntary, reciprocal, and comparable basis. Their purpose is to create a better understanding of each side's ballistic missile defence activities as early as the research stage - years before the appearance of advanced defences in the field.

At the Wyoming ministerial, Secretary of State Baker began an effort to see whether the areas of agreement on predictability measures could be expanded to become a point of mutual advantage. To stimulate our Soviet colleagues' understanding of the United States predictability measures for

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"visits to laboratories", Secretary Baker offered a first-hand, practical demonstration. He invited a group of Soviet experts to visit two United States laboratories conducting SDI research. The visit took place last December and was very successful. My friend Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, who led the group, described the visit as a useful confidence-building measure. The Soviet experts received briefings, saw hardware first-hand, and had an opportunity to ask numerous questions of United States scientists conducting the research. The visit was designed both to foster transparency and to stimulate the negotiations on predictability measures. Subsequent to the visit, we were pleased when the Soviet Union accepted the concept of visits to laboratories as a predictability measure.

At the meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Washington earlier this month, the United States proposed that the two sides agree on predictability measures in the form of a free-standing agreement - not linked to the ABM Treaty. The United States draft agreement calls on the parties to implement the predictability measures I have just outlined. To illustrate how such an agreement might work and to inform our negotiations, last month in Geneva the United States proposed reciprocal pilot implementation of the United States predictability measures for a single project on each side. The United States chose as its project the Infra-red Background Signature Survey. We have asked the Soviet Union to select a Soviet project for pilot implementation. The United States idea is that the sides should conduct a "try-out" before implementing the free-standing predictability agreement. In this respect the initiative is similar to "try-outs" in other negotiations - the joint verification experiment in the United States-Soviet nuclear testing talks, the verification and stability measures in the START negotiations, and the bilateral data exchange and verification experiment in the United States-Soviet chemical weapons bilateral discussions. There has been recent and important progress on predictability measures. The sides agree that they should expand and strengthen them.

On the remaining issues in our negotiations, much remains to be done to achieve a defence and space treaty that provides for greater stability in the years ahead as new technologies open the way for reducing the threat posed by ballistic missiles. Attaining this goal would contribute to greater security for the entire international community, and be the first co-operative transition in the history of United States-Soviet strategic relations.

Having spoken about our diplomatic efforts to achieve a co-operative transition to greater reliance on strategic ballistic missile defences, I thought it would be useful to discuss briefly the United States commitment to such defences and the contributions they could make. On 7 February, at the Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory, President Bush stated: "In the 1990s, strategic defence makes much more sense than ever before". He added later that day in San Francisco: "Let's be clear: this purely defensive concept doesn't threaten a single person anywhere in the world. God forbid, if it ever had to be used, it would be used against missiles, not against people".

(Mr. Smith, United States)

The President's emphasis on the value of defences is best understood in terms of how they can contribute to international security for the balance of this century and into the next. There are four main reasons why effective defences can bring about a safer world. First, preventing nuclear war must remain a fundamental goal. Survivable and effective strategic defences would strengthen deterrence and reduce the risk of war by significantly complicating the planning and execution of a first strike with strategic offensive forces. Second, as the United States and the Soviet Union reduce substantially their strategic offensive arms, advanced defences can play a growing role in insuring against the consequences of potential abrogation, break-out and cheating in connection with such reductions. Third, new threats are emerging against which effective non-nuclear defences can provide substantial protection. As more countries develop ballistic missiles, along with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, threats to the international community will increase. Fourth, effective defences can provide protection against accidental or unauthorized launches of ballistic missiles. If such a catastrophic event were ever to occur, the value of defences in human lives saved would be incalculable. Taking into account these purposes and their relevance now, the United States is determined to preserve the option to develop and deploy effective, advanced, defences when they are ready, at a measured pace and in a co-operative way. This is our goal in the defence and space talks.

It has been an honour to appear before the Conference on Disarmament today. I wish you the best for a successful conclusion of the spring session, and I hope to have the opportunity to address this body again in the future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for introducing the statements that we have just heard and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. At the same time, I also wish to thank the head of the delegation of the United States of America to the bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms, Ambassador Richard R. Burt, as well as Ambassador David Smith, for their statements which have provided the Conference with information on the status of those negotiations. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): As the Soviet delegation is taking the floor for the first time in plenary in April I should first of all like to express our satisfaction at the fact that you, Mr. President, are leading the work of the Conference in the course of this month. We have already had direct experience of your great diplomatic skill, your tact and your singleness of purpose, and now we note with satisfaction that all these qualities of yours have once again very strongly manifested themselves in the course of this month, a month which completes the spring part of the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament. In the course of this time the work of the Conference has expanded even more. Under your guidance the Conference has begun to hold informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3. We are also pleased that tomorrow we are going to hold the first informal discussion of the crucial problem of the enhancement of the work of the Conference. Of course the Soviet delegation wishes you as successful a conclusion to this month as its beginning. At the same time I should like once again to express my gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria, Mr. Azikiwe, for his guidance of the work of the Conference in March. While I have this opportunity I should

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like to express my very best wishes to the distinguished ambassadors who are leaving us or have already left us and taken up new duties - the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja, and the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

I should also like to heartily welcome our new colleague, the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Králik, who is participating in our work today for the first time, and wish him every success in this task. The Soviet delegation was also pleased to learn that our long-standing colleague Mrs. Sinegiorgis of Ethiopia has recently been appointed her country's Ambassador to the Conference.

The Conference has just heard statements from the distinguished Ambassadors Burt and Smith, who described the state of affairs at the bilateral Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms. I should now like to invite Ambassador Nazarkin, the head of the USSR delegation at the nuclear and space talks, to take the floor to brief you on this matter. Ambassador Nazarkin is well known to most of the members of the Conference because he headed the delegation of the USSR at the Conference for two years until the end of April last year. Before that Ambassador Nazarkin headed the department dealing with the peaceful use of nuclear energy and space in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. For many years he has been actively involved with disarmament issues, above all in the multilateral field, both in New York and in Geneva. So with your permission, Mr. President, I shall hand over to Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I should like to express my gratitude for the opportunity afforded to me today to take the floor at the Conference on Disarmament, this crucial multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, in whose work I had occassion to participate relatively recently. It is pleasant to see in this hall the familiar faces of my old colleagues and friends from our work in the Conference on Disarmament, and also to welcome the new ambassadors appointed as representatives of Kenya, the Netherlands, China, Japan, Canada, Venezuela, the United States, Mexico and in particular the representative of Czechoslovakia, Juraj Králik, who is attending a meeting of the Conference for the first time today.

I should like to ask the delegations of these countries to convey to their former heads, Ambassadors Simon Bullut, Robert van Schaík, Fan Guoxiang, Chusei Yamada, Montigny Marchand, Adolfo Raúl Taylhardat, Max Friedersdorf, Alfonso García Robles and Vratislav Vajnar, my very best wishes in their future life and work. In connection with the forthcoming departure of the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Paul Joachim von Stülpnagel, I should like to express my regret at the fact that his departure from Geneva will prevent my wife and myself from maintaining our warm and friendly contacts with him and his wife, Carola. I wish him every success in his new important post. I have also received information regarding the forthcoming departure from Geneva of the

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representative of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Azambuja, on his appointment to an important new post. In addition to my regret at his departure, I should like to ask the delegation of Brazil to convey to Ambassador Azambuja my sincere congratulations. I am pleased once again to see here in this room the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Vicente Berasategui, who is making an exceptionally useful and highly qualified contribution to the work of the Conference.

It was with great interest and attention that I listened to the statements made by my colleagues and friends, the head of the delegation of the United States to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, Ambassador Richard Burt, and Ambassador David Smith.

Eight months ago, here in this room, I had an opportunity to set out the state of affairs at the nuclear and space talks as of 3 August last year. Today I see my task as that of describing the progress that has been achieved in drawing up the START treaty since my previous statement. The Malta meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States held at the beginning of December last year had decisive a impact on the progress of the talks. Their agreement concerning the need to resolve all the major problems related to the START treaty before the summer 1990 summit and to sign the treaty during the same year has basically added a qualitatively new dimension to the talks. The President of the USSR and the President of the United States also exchanged views on NST problems through the exchange of messages. Of great significance were the meetings between the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, and United States President G. Bush held in the second half of September last year and at the beginning of April this year, as well as the meetings between United States Secretary of State J. Baker and Soviet President M.S. Gorbachev at the beginning of February this year. These meetings took place during E.A. Shevardnadze's visit to Washington and J. Baker's visit to Moscow.

Before the meeting of the Soviet and United States foreign ministers held in Wyoming on 22 and 23 September last year, a process of reciprocal adaptation took place between the Soviet leadership and the new United States Administration. During this process political priorities were defined and various options were developed and selected. Throughout this entire period Moscow and Washington maintained contact, including contact at the highest level. Therefore, when the sides came to the Wyoming meeting they already had behind them considerable contact and an understanding that they could and should move further in developing their relations. It would be no exaggeration to state that the Wyoming discussions ushered in a new stage in the Soviet-American dialogue. The principal characteristic of this new stage is the fact that the sides have moved from mutual understanding to mutual action. The main goal of the Moscow meeting of the ministers held from 7 to 9 February this year was to undertake efforts aimed at resolving a number of specific problems where possible, in accordance with the instructions given in Malta, thus opening up prospects for further constructive preparations for M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Washington.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The talks focused on the problems related to the drafting of the START treaty. During the talks progress was achieved in a number of important areas. As you know, the date of Soviet President M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States (30 May to 3 June this year) were set at the Washington meeting of the Soviet and United States foreign ministers held from 4 to 6 April this year. This summit meeting is to be a major landmark in world politics, and is to culminate in major agreements in the most diverse fields of international and Soviet-American relations. The constructive development of Soviet-American relations is an especially valuable factor of stability against the backdrop of turbulent and complex changes taking place in the world and the dynamic internal developments in various countries.

The Washington talks centred on arms limitation and reduction problems, and above all on issuess related to finalizing the START treaty. The discussions received a political boost as a result of the message sent by President M.S. Gorbachev to President Bush of the United States, which set forth new major ideas both on general measures for enhancing strategic stability and on solutions to some important issues at the NST talks. The sides reaffirmed their intention, agreed in Malta, to work for the signing of the START treaty before the end of this year, and with that purpose in mind to have it initialled in the course of the forthcoming visit by M.S. Gorbachev to the United States. The participants in the Washington negotiations concentrated on seeking agreement on outstanding key issues in the future START treaty - relating to air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. So far it has not proved possible to eliminate differences altogether, but the sides agreed to exert maximum efforts to do so in the time remaining before the summit.

Package solutions are being earnestly sought on both ALCMs and SLCMs. There are still divergencies on some elements of these packages, although on others such an agreement is already taking shape. But these are package solutions, and until we reach agreement on the whole there can be no final agreement on the constituent parts. This is the normal negotiating process.

At the Washington meeting a thoroughgoing exchange of views was held on future START talks which would begin immediately following the signing of the treaty on 50 per cent reductions which we are working on now. The Soviet side submitted its draft joint statement in this regard which could be adopted at the forthcoming summit. We see it as a statement of intent on what we are to do after the signature of the START treaty. We have a mutual understanding with the American side that it is at the forthcoming summit that we must determine the main lines and areas of work on reducing arms and armed forces and overcoming the military confrontation between the two countries. Throughout nearly all this period, the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms have continued here in Geneva working on the practical details of the START treaty and its accompanying documents. At the end of September last year, soon after the Wyoming ministerial meeting, round 12 began, which ended on 8 December. Round 13 began on 22 January this year and is still going on. In view of the huge amount of work before us, we have taken steps to make the negotiations as intensive and extensive as possible. Specifically, the negotiating process in Geneva did not stop either for the Moscow or for the Washington ministerial meetings, despite the fact that the heads of both delegations participated in them.

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I now turn to the status of the NST talks. The problem of ABMs and space occupies an important place at the talks. Our position is based on the existence of an objective interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. The point is that the establishment of large-scale ABM defensive systems, particularly space-based systems, can inevitably entail a qualitative and a quantitative build-up in strategic offensive arms. The existence of such an objective interlinkage was recognized by the USSR and the United States during their negotiations on the ABM Treaty in 1972. The idea was also taken into account when the mandate of the current nuclear and space talks was being worked out. The Soviet Union favours the preservation of the ABM Treaty and the strengthening of its régime. Compliance with the ABM Treaty was one of the most contentious issues at the talks. Until recently the sides' differences of approach on this issue were blocking the way towards the START treaty. At the meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the United States Secretary of State in Wyoming last September, the Soviet side proposed a new approach that opened the way to completion of the START treaty. The Soviet Union expressed its preparedness to sign and ratify the START treaty even should there be no agreement on the ABM problem between the sides in time for the completion of the treaty, but the sides would have to continue to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. That approach was reaffirmed at the subsequent Moscow and Washington meetings of foreign ministers. We believe that there should be an understanding that the withdrawal of one of the parties from the ABM Treaty, or its violation, would give the other party the right to withdraw from the START treaty. At the same time, in order to preclude any further disputes on the meaning of compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, the Soviet side proposed the negotiation of a common understanding of the boundary between permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty, and tabled a draft protocol to the ABM Treaty on this matter at the negotiations. The Soviet side also favours the elaboration at the talks of far-reaching confidence-building and predictability measures, which, in our view, should enhance the sides' confidence that obligations assumed by them under the ABM Treaty will be strictly fulfilled. We have submitted a draft agreement to this effect that provides for an array of such measures. It should be noted that despite a certain community of views on some predictability measures, the sides still have major differences of a conceptual nature.

In connection with the fact that today reference was made by Ambassador D. Smith to the American draft agreement "on measures to facilitate a co-operative transition to the deployment of future strategic ballistic missile defences", I should like to state the following. In our view the purpose of this draft in essence is to replace the ABM Treaty and to give the United States the opportunity to conduct the development and testing, under the SDI programme, of systems and components prohibited under the ABM Treaty. The draft also gives the United States the right to take a decision at any time to deploy large-scale ABM systems, including in space. The American side asserts that the deployment of such large-scale ABM systems will lead to strategic stability. We cannot go along with that. The creation and deployment of such ABM systems and the placing of weapons in outer space can lead only to the undermining of strategic stability and a reduction in the level of security, because it will inevitably lead to competition in the field of both strategic defensive arms and strategic offensive weapons - in other words, an arms race on a new and even more dangerous level. This will

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inevitably also lead to the destruction of fundamental international agreements in the area of arms control. Stability and security in our time can only be reciprocal, and are achieved not by the continuation of the arms race but rather through the consistent reduction of strategic offensive weapons together with strict limitations on strategic defensive systems, a ban on the placing of arms in outer space and the expansion of confidence-building and predictability measures.

I have already mentioned the question of confidence-building and predictability measures. However, in connection with what we have heard from Ambassador David Smith, I should like to make a few additional comments. Although both parties recognize the importance of developing and practically implementing such measures, there are fundamental differences between them regarding the purpose these measures should serve. We cannot agree with the American side's assertion that such measures should be aimed at fostering a transition to a régime which is more strictly based on defence, because the transition itself leads to the disruption of strategic stability and the undermining of security. It is our conviction that such measures can be useful where they are aimed at enhancing trust and guaranteeing the confidence of the parties in the fact that the obligations they assumed under the ABM Treaty are being complied with. It is quite obvious that without such confidence talking about predictability in the ABM field would be impossible.

I have already referred to the fact that there is a certain convergence in the parties' approaches to individual confidence-building and predictability measures. This enables us to continue conducting substantive work at the talks and to seek areas of agreement here. As for the proposals recently submitted by the American side regarding trial predictability measures, which Ambassador Smith also referred to, we are currently considering these proposals. On a preliminary basis I would like to say that, although the idea of trial measures is more and more frequently raised in the preparation of disarmament agreements, at a time when there are fundamental differences between the parties regarding the thrust of predictability measures it would be difficult to implement any trial measures in this field. First of all, we feel, it would be essential to bring the parties' positions closer together regarding the thrust of predictability measures, and then to give some thought to the actual conduct of such measures.

Ambassador Smith mentioned the visit I made in December 1989 as a member of a group of Soviet experts to the American laboratories at San Juan Capistrano and Los Alamos. We consider such visits to be a means of building confidence between the USSR and the United States. The contacts that have been established between Soviet and American experts, both in the course of visiting these two laboratories and in the course of informal discussions on individual aspects of the ABM problem, are useful. Moreover, this trip, as we saw it, reconfirmed how important it is that the ABM-related activities of the parties should not move beyond the confines of the ABM Treaty.

I now turn to the state of affairs regarding the drawing up of the START treaty. That work continues on the basis of the major parameters codified in the joint statements issued following the Washington (1987) and Moscow (1988) summits. The delegations' endeavours are now focused on negotiating joint draft texts of the treaty proper and its accompanying documents, that is,

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a memorandum containing base-line data on Soviet and United States strategic offensive arms and protocols on procedures for conducting inspections, conversion or elimination, etc. These drafts contain fully agreed articles and provisions and partially agreed language. One of the most difficult problems being dealt with at the talks is the problem of measures to verify compliance with the future treaty on strategic offensive arms. Of course, in this connection the practice and experience acquired with the implementation of the INF Treaty are being drawn on. However, the subject and the scope of the new treaty, strategic arms, call for broader and more far-reaching measures. As you know, the START treaty provides for the limitation of strategic systems rather than their complete elimination. The two sides' remaining armaments must be subject to effective verification. This means that the verification measures that are being drawn up must be more complex and extensive. The most important component of the verification machinery is the inspection activities carried out by means of on-site inspections, both on a routine and on a "suspect site" basis, that is on challenge, as well as continuous monitoring of production facilities for strategic offensive arms. As of now the draft treaty provides for 13 instances - that is, parameters and types of activities - for conducting different kinds of inspection activities. Broad and detailed procedures for those activities have for the most part been agreed upon in a separate document, the joint draft inspection protocol. This draft sets out arrangements for the formation of inspection teams, their status, transport to the inspection sites, inspection procedures establishing a schedule for providing notification of inspections, the conveyance of inspection equipment and supplies, the provision of lodging, meals and medical assistance to the inspectors and many other issues.

In parallel with efforts to negotiate the verification articles of the treaty and the provisions on procedures in the protocol on inspections, both sides are seeking ways to make it less complex without thereby undermining the effectiveness and viability of the treaty and the confidence of the sides in compliance with future obligations. The verification mechanism under the future treaty includes the use by each side of its national technical means of verification and prohibits interference with the national technical means of verification of the other side. In particular, it involves a ban on encryption of telemetry data transmitted during flight tests from ballistic missiles. There are still some differences in the two sides' approach to "suspect site" inspections. We believe that the basis for resolving this problem exists, but further efforts are needed. As you know, during the Wyoming ministerial meeting last September the two sides signed an agreement on principles for implementing trial verification measures. Such measures are being worked out, agreed upon and implemented in particular in regard to the conduct of a series of on-site inspections. Their purpose is to ensure maximum confidence in the effectiveness and reliability of the verification mechanism being developed. Here in Geneva the Soviet and American experts have already conducted an experiment on the tagging of strategic offensive weapons. In accordance with the agreed schedule heavy bombers were shown yesterday to American experts in the Soviet Union, to be followed after some time by the nose cone of a heavy ICMB of the SS-18 type and an SLBM of the SS-N-23 type. In turn the American side will show Soviet experts the nose cone of an ICBM of the MX type, heavy bombers and a Trident-2 SLBM.

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There is a convergence of positions on the issue of mobile ICBMs. The sides have finally agreed on imposing limitations on these systems. The remaining differences relate essentially to the methods for applying such limitations and verifying compliance. At the heart of this problem is the need to find and agree on an optimum balance between, on the one hand, preserving the survivability of mobile ICBMs, and, on the other, considerations of reliability verification of compliance with the limitations on these systems. Of course verification of mobile systems is more difficult than verification of fixed systems. However, mobility contributing to greater survivability should not be ensured at the expense of less complex verification. We are at present working to find a rational solution to this problem.

The delegations have also focused their attention on devising a formula relating to the obligation of the sides not to circumvent the future treaty. In this context it is necessary to ensure that possible channels for circumventing the treaty - that is, undermining its effectiveness - are securely blocked. It seems that we are now close to finding a solution to this problem too.

The outstanding issues also include the non-deployment of strategic offensive arms outside the national territories of the sides, and verification in this area. A schedule for the elimination of strategic offensive arms subject to reduction is being negotiated. The main concern here is to ensure a smooth process and preserve parity at all phases of reduction.

One of the main obligations that will be assumed by the sides under the future treaty is to reduce their strategic offensive arms to the agreed levels. Naturally, this obligation requires a solid guarantee that the above-mentioned reductions are genuine and irreversible. Hence, there is a need to work out appropriate procedures for conversion or elimination of systems subject to the treaty. The major requirement with respect to such procedures is that they should preclude the possibility that the systems being cut will be restored or reconverted to their prior status. It should be noted that the sides have already agreed on the bulk of these procedures. However, some problems, mainly of a technical nature, remain. They relate to the fact that certain types of armament of the USSR and the United States have their own specific features. Nevertheless, we believe that we will soon manage to resolve these problems fully.

I have broached only some issues that do not cover the entire range of work that needs to be done. It should be taken into account that when major political agreements are reached, they still have to be formalized in treaty language. Hence a great deal has yet to be accomplished at the negotiations.

I cannot fail to mention yet another difficulty which will have to be dealt with. The negotiations have now reached the final stage. Our efforts have brought us to the point where there should be clear vision of what lies behind one option or another, how it might affect national security interests and whether situations which can be used for gaining a unilateral advantage are securely precluded. The choices we have to make are hard. As far as the Soviet position is concerned, I must say that the principal considerations underlying it now are increasingly dictated by the need to ensure the

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ratification of the future treaty by the Soviet parliament. On many occasions we have heard our American colleagues saying that their acceptance of a particular provision would complicate the ratification of the treaty. After the political reform in the Soviet Union we are now using a similar touchstone. It is a fact that we and the United States now find ourselves in the same position. The emergence of this factor has resulted in certain difficulties and complex problems. This new situation means that we must check certain provisions of the treaty again and yet again against the new political realities in our country. What is needed is a more thorough examination of all problems so as to avoid difficulties in the future. This will provide an assurance that the agreement we are working on will prove to be stable. I believe that this would meet the interests not only of the Soviet Union and the United States but also other countries. The treaty will result in more stable security at significantly lower levels of nuclear balance, and the risk of nuclear war will diminish. The treaty will become a major factor in ensuring an improvement in Soviet-American relations, and hence the entire global political climate. Finally, the treaty will become a springboard for moving towards still more radical agreements in the field of reductions in and qualitative limitations of strategic offensive arms.

There is not much time left before the summit, and even less before the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the United States (to be held from 16 to 19 May), by which time mutually acceptable options with respect to outstanding issues with the START treaty must be found. As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, it has been instructed to expedite this work in every way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the USSR, Mr. Batsanov, for his introductory statement and for his kind words addressed to me. I also wish to thank the head of the Soviet delegation to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms, our old friend and colleague Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, for the statement that he has just delivered on the status of those negotiations. I now give the floor to the representative of Senegal, Ambassador Alioune Sene.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time during this 1990 spring session of the Conference on Disarmament, I wish first of all to congratulate you on your election to the presidency of this important United Nations body. Knowing your outstanding qualities as a diplomat and your familiarity with international issues, we are certain that you will conduct our work effectively and successfully. These congratulations are also addressed to all your predecessors, including my colleague Azikiwe, who have helped our proceedings run smoothly. It is true that since my last statement to this august assembly on 25 August 1988 many distinguished colleagues have left and their eminent successors have arrived to continue this noble task in this sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament. Amongst those who have left, how could one forget our dean and friend García Robles, an outstanding figure in Mexican diplomacy, depositary of the values of Latin American humanism, strategist of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, fervent incarnation of hope, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and the witness of history at the end of this century? We call upon Ambassador Marín Bosch, his worthy successor, to be kind enough to convey to him our great admiration and our wishes for good health and

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happiness in an intellectually rich, intense and fruitful retirement. Finally, I would like to address my thanks to Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference, and Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, and the entire secretariat for their kind and efficient co-operation.

Today, after 40 years of cold war, we are witnessing unprecedented geopolitical and strategic change. The speed of change in Europe has taken even the wisest political observers by surprise. We have before us a process whose outcome we do not know but whose repercussions go far beyond the European continent. In any event the new politico-military order to which these changes will give rise has not been forged yet. It is finding its way and becoming organized and what is now involved is the disintegration of the international order that was inherited from the Second World War and was based on bipolar ideological and military antagonism between East and West, but as a result of the détente we are experiencing today we can say that 1989, the year of the bicentenary of the French Revolution, will have constituted an echo in the political field and in disarmament. For the first time in history we have seen nuclear-weapon States agreeing to eliminate, on a bilateral basis, a whole category of weapons. I refer to the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose distinguished representatives have just given us a briefing on the state of their bilateral negotiations concerning strategic weapons in the run-up to the forthcoming summit, for which we extend our wishes for success.

Following the same line of thought, the reductions in conventional forces and confidence-building measures that are the subject of intensive negotiations in Europe and in Vienna in the context of CSCE, as well as the quest for peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, show clearly that beyond the balance of forces, the concept of security implies the commencement of an era of international co-operation.

Hence the Conference on Disarmament must adapt to this new state of affairs, to the favourable international situation, in order to achieve concrete results in its area of competence so as to strengthen its credibility. In this connection we must welcome the considerable efforts that have been made by the Conference on Disarmament since last year to draw up a convention totally banning chemical weapons. The impetus which was thus given by the Paris Conference at the beginning of last year made the elimination of existing stockpiles and chemical weapon production facilities, as well as the total prohibition of the production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer or use of these weapons, a common and irrevocable cause for the entire international community. In short, all the States participating in the Paris Conference undertook to redouble their efforts within the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date.

Thus, under the outstanding guidance of Ambassador Morel, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons made remarkable progress last year. Thanks to his savoir-faire, Ambassador Morel contributed to the redefinition of concepts in the "rolling text" by reconciling the various points of view. In this connection we should point to the place of the new annex on chemicals, the protocol on inspection procedures and the work on techniques relating to the verification régime established under the convention, the progress made

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on the final clauses and the texts concerning the membership of the Executive Council - all reference points for chemical arms control. Subsequently, the Conference of Governments and chemical industry representatives that took place in Canberra last year also showed the need for co-operation with those working in the chemical industry in the implementation of any convention completely banning chemical weapons. Most certainly my delegation is convinced that under the guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, and working in a constructive spirit, the Committee will be able to attain the objectives assigned to it in a reasonable period of time. As of now, it is reassuring to see that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to reduce their chemical weapons gradually. Even if certain aspects are conditional, the commitments announced show that the two Powers in question, which have the largest CW stockpiles, recognize their special responsibility with regard to the destruction of these stockpiles until low and equal levels are reached pending the conclusion of the convention banning chemical weapons. This is indeed a decisive element that gives a positive impetus to the multilateral negotiations and a guarantee for large-scale accession to the future convention on chemical weapons.

As my delegation stated at the Paris Conference, Senegal has no chemical weapons and has no intention of acquiring any. So far as it is able, Senegal wishes to make its own modest contribution to the rapid conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons.

It goes without saying that the chemical weapons ban is not the only focal point on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The complete prohibition of nuclear testing is also a priority issue. In this very connection it is to be regretted that the Conference has still not managed to agree on a mandate for a committee to examine this issue. Nevertheless, a tribute should be paid to the vigorous efforts that Ambassador Yamada of Japan made last year to try and pin down the mandate of an ad hoc committee on nuclear tests. It is to be hoped that Ambassador Donowaki, who is continuing those efforts, will meet with success and find the way out of this impasse.

The United States and the Soviet Union have made progress in virtually concluding the development of the verification régimes provided for in the treaty on the limitation of underground tests and the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions, but it is true that we have had to wait almost 10 years since the signing of these two instruments in order to devise verification systems that show nevertheless that it is possible to guarantee compliance with a test ban. Others are proposing a conference to convert the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by jointly involving the international community. This, of course, is an interesting approach. Even if there is no short-cut in this field, as some believe, we should work out the terms for negotiations on this issue in order to persevere, on the basis of consensus, with the elaboration of a reliable and lasting system. In any event, all the multilateral questions relating to nuclear weapons are within the purview of the Conference on Disarmament. Consequently my delegation considers that the Conference on Disarmament should spare no effort to concentrate henceforth on the substantive issues concerning a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. It must be recognized that the Conference on Disarmament has not really made decisive progress on these last two issues either, whether from the point of

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view of a structured debate on the cessation of the nuclear arms race or on the negotiation and elaboration of principles and confidence-building measures for nuclear disarmament, which of course would be inseparable from prevention in the field of nuclear proliferation.

In all likelihood, the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to open shortly in Geneva and will offer an opportunity for an exhaustive analysis of all the factors that can enhance the credibility of the Treaty. The Treaty has proved to be a useful tool in efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and for that reason the maintenance and strengthening of this régime deserve support. The fundamental objective of the Treaty is the reduction of nuclear arms, followed by their elimination. In this context, the proliferation of technologies making use of fissionable material, which have prompted so many warnings, also merits our attention.

The fourth NPT conference is to consider the validity of the Treaty after 1995. Senegal will participate in this forthcoming review conference with the hope that there will be consensus on the validity of the Treaty after 1995, which will make it possible to strengthen the universality of this disarmament instrument in the interest of peace and world security. In fact, the halting and banning of nuclear tests constitute the best means of fighting for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially as a real process of nuclear disarmament has begun. In the meantime, the non-nuclear-weapon States demand negative security assurances within the framework of an international instrument or a formula legally binding on all the parties. Since the nuclear-weapon States made unilateral declarations of negative security assurances, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to arrive at a legal arrangement in due form despite the broad consensus which, moreover, is based on the rules of international customary law concerning the prohibition of any resort to force except in cases of self-defence. It is true that, through their declarations on negative security assurances, the nuclear-weapon States have acknowledged that resort to such weapons could only be contemplated in a much smaller number of cases than resort to conventional weapons. At the very least it is to be hoped that the Conference on Disarmament will make progress on this matter by drawing up an arrangement or measures of an internationally legally binding nature.

Another problem which prompts as much concern as the others is the prevention of an arms race in space, concerning which we have just heard very detailed presentations. Naturally, in the age of satellites, space technologies and the services they offer make them fundamental media of communication, information and data transmission, important matters in the modern world today. But it is no secret that in the system for the exploitation of space, there is an inevitable dissemination of military technologies at both the strategic and the tactical level. Yet under article I of the 1967 outer space Treaty, which has been ratified by 110 States, the use of space must be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of development, and such use is also the province of all mankind. Two years after this Treaty in 1969, man set foot on the Moon for the first time and recorded there that his mission reflected a striving for peace for all mankind. Since then, the refinement of weapons has taken great steps forward that have undoubtedly led

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to the emergence of new generations of armaments which can thus be placed in space - and we have had proof of this just now. In a field such as space, which holds enormous promise for the international community, particularly where scientific progress is concerned, there would be a risk that the growing militarization that can give rise to an arms race in this environment would revive another form of antagonism among Powers. There is therefore an urgent need for the international community to adopt effective measures to ensure that space does not become a new area of confrontation. From this point of view the proposals that have been put forward in the Conference on Disarmament deserve our full attention. Whether they are for strengthening the registration Convention, the verification and protection of satellites, especially those with the scientific function of remote sensing and remote observation of the weather or the Earth, in a word all the equipment designed to safeguard common security and make the international environment safer. In short, the establishment of an international space monitoring agency could undoubtedly contribute to the verification of compliance with the treaties concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I will conclude by saying that through the current détente we must call more than ever on the political will of the Powers that have special responsibilities in maintaining peace and international security, as well as all the members of the United Nations, to take urgent measures with a view to halting the arms race, avoiding the risks of war and preventing the use of force or intervention, in order to move from an era of security relations based on antagonism to an era of relations based on co-operation and trust. In order to do this, there will be a need for detailed knowledge of each other's military doctrines and strategies in a climate of transparency, through "open skies", as the experts say nowadays, in order to study threatening asymmetries and offensive capabilities. Because if we wish to overcome prejudice, to dispel distrust and the fear of threat, we must come round to concepts of defensive strategy and minimal deterrence.

Of course, much remains to be done - we must keep our feet on the ground - to prevent wars and make military aggression throughout the world, an option that no Government could envisage and where military forces will have the role of preserving national independence and territorial integrity. Doubtless, what is happening today in Europe fills us with enthusiasm, because it marks a radical change in mentalities and in geostrategic outlook. At the same time, we know that this process started long ago, with the Helsinki Document in 1975, and covers a vast area ranging from economic co-operation to human rights. Yet will this happy period of dialogue and co-operation which is beginning between East and West do away with all the tensions here and there that are due to historical, political, ethnic, religious or socio-economic causes? Well, we think so, because we are convinced that human intelligence today is capable of building on the ruins of the old order a new, fairer, more prosperous, more fraternal order of greater solidarity. However, the establishment of a stable and lasting order of peace in Europe, which we ardently desire, cannot be separated from the rest of the globe in so far as strategic imbalances in other regions can have repercussions on world security and stability. And as we know, war is still raging in certain parts of the third world. We are even witnessing, according to certain sources, a build-up of nuclear weaponry in areas of tension among neighbouring countries, posing

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a new security problem, not to speak of the heightened risks of uncontrolled proliferation. The same sources discern a proliferation of ballistic missiles armed with chemical or nuclear warheads, as well as the spread of the requisite production techniques. Hence there is a need to find effective solutions in as broad a framework as possible in order to safeguard strategic stability and international security before these political hypotheses become reality.

The objective of world disarmament and the prevention of war, whether nuclear or conventional, necessarily requires mutual understanding among States, organized through creative co-operation in the areas of politics and security, economics and trade, ecology and culture, human rights and humanitarian action, responding to the fundamental aspirations of nations for freedom, dignity and well-being. At the regional level, we must give assistance in implementing measures for arms limitation, the cessation of the arms race, the conclusion of disarmament treaties, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace which can enhance confidence and stability amongst States, as well as the negotiated settlement of major international issues and, in particular, regional conflicts in the world.

In concluding, we wish to emphasize once again that in this historical period where the super-Powers are taking initiatives with regard to nuclear disarmament and the banning of chemical weapons by accepting verification as an essential element in any arms limitation or reduction agreement, it is clear that today we are moving away from the certainties of the cold war and the balance of terror, and so much the better. The moment has therefore come to think deeply about the structure of the Conference on Disarmament under the critical eye of the new international situation that we must at all costs make more harmonious and more peaceful for the benefit of development. Because the true question is how to maintain peace and international security in the age of the absolute weapon, that is to say, the atomic bomb and weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Most certainly, we must pursue the priority objectives of the disarmament problématique by quitting well-worn paths, as was very appropriately pointed out by Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil with all the authority, all the nobility of view, the enlightenment and the exhilarating eloquence for which we know him. Our best wishes go with him in his new post. Thus the task is to overcome differences of opinion and conflicts of interest, to broaden the basis of understanding and consensus approaches through dialogue and negotiation by adapting to the evolution of the international situation.

Finally, at a time when the world is entering the era of institutionalized negotiation and when the two super-Powers, which have the biggest and most sophisticated stockpiles of weapons, are taking up their special responsibility in the field of disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament should take advantage of the situation, as it has done today. The will to establish confidence, as was stated a few moments ago by the distinguished representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, can straightaway create a climate that is conducive to the solution of problems by devising concrete measures and lasting agreements in a flexible and practical way, through transparency in verification. The laudable efforts made by the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as the negotiation of a 50 per cent cut in their strategic arms, should, in order to set a better example, be based on

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a significant reduction in their nuclear and conventional stockpiles and a halt to the arms race. This, we think, would be the best way to consolidate the positive trends today which can accelerate the process of arms limitation and reduction. In this connection, the constructive parallelism between the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations and the multilateral disarmament efforts under the auspices of the United Nations should complement and strengthen each other in order to help jointly to build a safer and more stable world to maintain that peace on a global scale of which we have had a foretaste and promises today. In short, it is a matter of overcoming war and barbarism in order to better arm the human species - man - in combating the ecological imbalances on Earth today, combating poverty and illiteracy, combating hunger and disease in order to grapple with the challenges of survival and development.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Senegal, my friend, colleague and brother Ambassador Alioune Sene, for his important statement, as well as for the very kind words he addressed to me.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): May I be allowed to express my appreciation to the distinguished Ambassadors Richard Burt and David Smith and our old friend and colleague, Yuri Nazarkin, for their comprehensive and substantive briefing on the status of the United States-USSR strategic and space disarmament talks? I hope that we will have the privilege of hearing them more often in our Conference. I would like to extend a warm welcome in our midst to His Excellency Ambassador Juraj Králik, head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia to the Conference on Disarmament, and wish him every success in his new assignment. He can count on the full co-operation of my delegation. I also take this opportunity to express our gratitude to our outgoing colleagues, Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil and Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, who contributed so much to the work of our Conference. I wish them all the best in their important new assignments.

Although the question of improved and effective functioning is not formally on the agenda nor in the programme of work of the Conference, I would nevertheless like to make a few observations on this subject as there is growing interest in it as we search for ways to exploit to the maximum the potentials of the Conference.

The Yugoslav delegation raised some aspects of this question as far back as 1985. My aim today is to try to make a step forward, if not in elaborating this complex issue, then at least in articulating the different notions.

It goes without saying that the efficiency of a system does not depend on technical and organizational arrangements nor on amending eventual structural deficiencies, but on political stands and on the behaviour of the protagonists within the system. Nevertheless, the Conference can improve its efficiency,

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or at least its image, by a continual reassessment of the way its role is being fulfilled. The starting-point in such a reassessment is, however, in the strong belief of my delegation, that the Conference is the only global multilateral negotiating body and that it cannot change its goals without taking the risk of losing its raison d'être. Of course, in accomplishing its negotiating role the Conference carries out intensive preparatory work and, through this process, identifies and shapes security and disarmament concepts. The speed with which this process leads to real negotiations sometimes depends precisely on how it approaches this preparatory stage of its negotiating role.

For better orientation, the question of improved and effective functioning should be treated at three different levels, even though at least two of them overlap, especially when speaking of the conditions necessary for establishing subsidiary organs, the extension of their mandates, the participation of non-member States, etc.

The first level would cover purely technical and procedural aspects of the Conference's functioning, as contained in document CD/WP.100/Rev.1. To this we could add issues on documentation, scheduling of the Conference and so forth.

The second level would cover questions that in part have to do with the provisions of the rules of procedure, and are to some extent political in character. The Group of Seven raised the right questions and offered alternatives in documents CD/WP.341 and CD/WP.286. It is regrettable that these documents were not more thoroughly discussed and that those innovations which would have made it possible to focus on substantive issues were neglected.

In this context, my delegation continues to attach particular importance to the following. Firstly, the easing of formalities in the decision-making procedure on the participation of non-members of the Conference, which could be done, for example, through mere notification of a non-member's intention to participate, or even by inviting a non-member for consultations at the Conference's own initiative. Secondly, more frequent resort to the participation of scientific and technical experts in the work of the Conference. Thirdly, measures to permit the setting up of working bodies on the basis of a unique, general mandate or even without a special mandate, keeping in mind that article 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I sets out the basic purpose of the Conference and that the working bodies are not separate organs but only forms in which the Conference works. Fourthly, review of the application of consensus in technical and procedural matters, and so forth.

Much more complex is the third level, dealing with the Conference's adjusting to new developments in international relations. These questions are eminently political in character and they encroach on the essence of the character, role and competence of the Conference as a negotiating organ.

The debate so far has shown that we are all thinking about the improved relations in the world; about diminishing the risk of conflicts; about reconsidering the concepts of security structures and setting up new ones; about the intensity of disarmament negotiations that have a global

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effect whatever the level at which they take place, etc. Such trends are creating more favourable conditions for interweaving and complementing multilateral, bilateral and regional negotiations, and impose the need for more flexible and realistic approaches in our work. I might mention in passing that the past few years, especially 1989, have led us to significantly change our perception of what is and what is not realistic, since the recent developments have taken us all by surprise, even the boldest futurologists. Although we all feel the new impulses and possibilities, we still draw different conclusions on how the Conference could improve its efficiency in changed conditions.

In the opinion of my delegation, adjustment should not change the negotiating role of the Conference by depriving it of the right to discuss certain disarmament issues. The most important issues cannot be solved exclusively within a bilateral frame, whatever its nature, while the definition of a stable security order can be a result only of broad international co-operation.

Adjustment can therefore be seen only as the strengthening of the Conference's role, the confirmation in practice of its right to deal with every basic disarmament issue. It is only in such conditions that the Conference can fully contribute to the existing dynamics of negotiations on a broader scale. It is only on such a basis that a layered and gradual approach to those questions on the agenda which are still resisting the multilateral negotiating approach will be possible and credible. This means taking into account the deliberative, pre-negotiatory and other phases, including the adoption of "intermediate" and "collateral" security-building measures, in order to promote the negotiations themselves. In order to make possible such a progressive approach, instead of a yes-or-no approach, and not reduce the role of the Conference to a kind of talking-shop, we all have to start changing and accepting the Conference in all its functions.

In other words, the Conference cannot behave as if it were the only sure democratic negotiating forum, that is, as if multilateralism were the only way to authentic disarmament. But nor can it be a simple collector of left-overs from other negotiating tables. In other words, its short-term, medium-term and long-term negotiating role has to be adapted to its real possibilities, without subordinating its activity to the existence or non-existence of working bodies, mandates or formal programmes of work. That is, it should use whatever possibilities it has to substantively consider all questions on all levels, to discuss programmes and proposals even when it is obvious that they are not ready for immediate negotiation because of divergences in views. In the final analysis the fundamental consideration of every problem represents, in fact, a stage in negotiating which, of course, cannot always be a drafting stage. The Conference thus has an important preparatory and informative role, which means the role of a catalyst in the permanent search for common elements and concepts, which should be constantly broadened and shaped on the road to concluding agreements.

Adjusting, therefore, is no abstraction, but is primarily the strengthening of the readiness to tackle all questions on the agenda, to bring methods of work up to date and innovate so that we may move forward faster to the ultimate objective in our negotiations on disarmament agreements.

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We should initiate, within this context, a more active and concrete debate on the agenda and bring it closer to the "decalogue". We should begin to consider more concretely the possible addition of new questions, the possibility of merging certain items on the agenda or a possible échelonnement in dealing with certain questions depending on the level of convergence of views. In this way, without neglecting any item, we would facilitate a focus on those questions for which a successful conclusion is directly within reach, as is the case right now of, for example, the convention on chemical weapons. Since the present agenda is already elaborate, whatever addition is made should be followed by a defining of genuine and not formal priorities, at least for a medium-term or short-term period.

The Yugoslav delegation is prepared to constructively study all new proposals made so far, with a view to stepping up the work of the Conference and taking into consideration the present developments at the global and regional level. Besides the proposals already submitted, for example, the issue of the security of non-aligned and developing countries deserves particular attention, since the new security order is being framed primarily within the developed world. Precisely because our Conference is the only global multilateral negotiating organ, it should initiate debates on all issues of disarmament and security and should indicate the solutions.

The Conference should make use of all the opportunities it has at its disposal, ranging from plenary sessions and ad hoc bodies to informal meetings, open presidential consultations, expert bodies and scientific round-table discussions, etc., to maintain a permanent, substantive exchange of opinions and proposals in search of common ground for negotiations. A more flexible approach to the mandate under item 1 (NTB), and the acceptance, for the first time, of informal sessions for item 3 on the agenda, for example, show the beginning of a slightly pragmatic approach to the work of the Conference.

Although this does not strictly form part of the topic, I believe that an innovative approach to the problem of increasing the number of members could be an area for bringing the Conference up to date in accordance with the changing structure of the international community. Here I have in mind the possible reassessing of the criteria of political balance, for example. As this is a sensitive political issue, it is still early for concrete conclusions, but it is right that we should start thinking about it.

The search for new ideas and new issues for debates, on whatever level, as well as the reassessment of and critical approach to the way its role is being fulfilled, must be a continual practice. The Conference must be alert to any political change, and must register and use any opportunity for enlarging the possibilities for negotiating and for the assertion of its role in the objective conditions of its activity. If we cannot do that which is indispensable, we must try at least to do that which is possible, namely, to get used to a step-by-step approach, to gradualness, not losing sight, of course, of the true goals. Any step, however small it may be, would be a contribution to bringing our Conference more into line with the broader possibilities for becoming an unavoidable chain in the negotiating process.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Mr. Chirila.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to tell you how happy the Romanian delegation is at seeing you so ably chairing the work of the Conference on Disarmament for April. Allow me also to extend a welcome to Ambassador Králik as the head of the Czechoslovak delegation.

In its statement of 13 February to the plenary of the Conference, our delegation had the opportunity of describing the general features of the Romanian position, its hopes and especially its complete readiness to support and contribute to the efforts aimed at bringing about a broad, continuous and dynamic process of disarmament at all levels and in all aspects. Thanks to the tireless efforts made by you and your predecessors, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands and Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, a concrete working context has been designed to bring about what we all agree to be necessary - the negotiation and above all the conclusion of agreements and measures agreed at the multilateral level, with universal scope, in the area of disarmament. Our debates and negotiations have highlighted in particular the fact that the more favourable political climate today offers conditions and hopes, but also imposes requirements, responsibilities and additional efforts to bring about meaningful results in the area of disarmament, inter alia and above all within the Geneva Conference. The discussions have also revealed that nuclear issues are still viewed as priority issues for this Conference. Our delegation takes note with satisfaction of the fact that, thanks in particular to the efforts of Ambassador Donowaki, more favourable conditions now obtain that could lead to a more specific dialogue on the question of a substantive mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. We hope that the Conference will soon find the flexibility and consensus which are so much needed to produce a reasonable, balanced mandate which can offer the required conditions for a substantive and well-targeted examination of this issue.

Concerning the important problem of the verification of a test-ban treaty, considerable progress has been made. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has developed a global system of seismic verification. My delegation is particularly pleased since, starting with this session, Romania has been participating in the Ad hoc Group and is going to commit its technical capabilities to the global international test that will produce its conclusions in 1991. We believe that, in order to guide other political decisions concerning participation in an international test of this nature, ways and means should be found, especially in areas hitherto insufficiently represented, to offer basic technical assistance and supplementary international co-operation. We consider that, in particular, the four international centres that have been established to test the global system seismic verification may be increasingly bearing this need and possibility in mind.

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

Remaining within the context of nuclear disarmanent, we share in the satisfaction that has been expressed of seeing the start of specific informal discussions on agenda items 2 and 3. Like many other delegations, we would have preferred the establishment of working and negotiating bodies - even ad hoc committees - on these two subjects. I take this opportunity to express our delegation's satisfaction at having heard the briefings given at this plenary meeting by the heads of the Soviet and American delegations to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms. We are sure that the substance of the statements made here by the two delegations will provide important points of reference for our informal discussions on items 2 and 3 on the Conference's agenda, and also for the work of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We reiterate our hope that the approach of the fourth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will encourage efforts and especially results in the entire nuclear sphere, including security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States. The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in a fairly reasonable time frame has given us the legitimate hope that this year substantive work, focused above all on specific results, is possible and wished for by all. Unfortunately, the move to substantive consideration of this problem, which is ever more pressing, has been delayed.

I should now like to make a few references to the negotiations concerning the draft convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons. In its statement of 13 February to the plenary of the Conference, our delegation expressed Romania's political willingness to work for the rapid conclusion of such a convention. This readiness remains; we are in favour of an effective universal convention with an appropriate verification regime. We have clearly stated that Romania has no chemical weapons, and it has no intention of producing or acquiring any. The strengthened mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons leads us to believe that the negotiations for the conclusion of a universal convention banning these weapons have now, so to speak, entered the final straight. In this regard progress concerning the structure of the future convention in particular has been significant. We greatly appreciate the efforts to deal with all aspects in detail, but as many other delegations have already emphasized here, we too consider that certain extended discussions, consultations and negotiations on purely technical or drafting issues could divert attention from essential, substantive issues which, in our view, should be dealt with directly, under a general approach, while avoiding unduly dwelling on one detail or another. We fully appreciate the determined contribution the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, has made in promoting the substantive work in order to clarify "sensitive" issues, to clear the way for the final drafting of the text of the convention. One problem cropping up very frequently in the discussion and negotiations is that concerning the universality of the future convention. We consider that the involvement of an ever-increasing number of countries in the negotiating process and the final adoption of the text of the convention by consensus are among conditions that favour the legitimate requirement of universality. Romania is ready to be an original signatory of a convention that is the result of such a process.

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

Finally, our delegation has followed and has taken note with great interest of the comments and opinions expressed here with a view to improving and even re-examining the basis for the activity of the Conference on Disarmament. As Ambassador Sujka emphasized here, such legitimate concerns should not overshadow the substantive work, the carrying out of the negotiating mandate of the Conference. Ambassador Hyltenius correctly emphasized recently here that in the final analysis the prerequisite for negotiating and reaching effective disarmament agreements and measures was and still is political will. We express the hope - the conviction - that such political will will prevail more and more in our work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Romania, Dr. Gheorghe Chirila, for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Mr. Gizowski.

Mr. GIZOWSKI (Poland): We have already had an opportunity to congratulate your delegation on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, but would like once again to wish you every success in discharging your responsible duties. May I take this opportunity to express our thanks to Ambassadors Richard Burt, David Smith and Yuri Nazarkin for their interesting information on the state of affairs in the United States-Soviet bilateral talks, which are of great importance for disarmament in general and the Conference on Disarmament in particular? I would also like to welcome among us Ambassador Juraj Králik of Czechoslovakia, and extend to him our assurances of full co-operation with him and his delegation.

My statement in the Conference today is connected with the presentation of a working paper on data relating to Poland relevant to the chemical weapons convention (CD/985), which has been distributed today. The data, reflecting the situation in Poland as at the end of 1989, were provided on a voluntary basis by the Polish bodies and institutions concerned in accordance with the format proposed in document CD/828 of 12 April 1988 presented by the Federal Republic of Germany. Details of the chemicals which are produced, processed or consumed in Poland are submitted in accordance with the tentatively agreed lists contained in CD/952 of 18 August 1989 and are based on the following thresholds: schedule 1 - 100 grams per year; schedule 2 - 1 ton per year; and schedule 3 - 30 tons per year.

By providing the data Poland wishes to join a considerable number of States which have already presented such information, as it shares their opinion on the importance of multilateral data exchange for our negotiations. We are of the opinion that a compilation of data relevant to the convention from all participants in the negotiations would facilitate the solution of outstanding issues. At the same time, the provision of such data prior to the signing of the convention will constitute one of a range of confidence-building measures in its support.

(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

It seems obvious and indisputable that progress in the negotiations might be faster and easier if they were built upon as much broad and comprehensive information as possible concerning both existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and their possessors and other data relevant to the convention. Such information enables us to foresee better the requirements of the future process of implementation of the convention, and to design properly and effectively appropriate verification mechanisms and the shape of the future organization. Openness and mutual confidence, particularly among States directly involved in our negotiations, whether members or non-members of the Conference, not only create a favourable atmosphere but also offer a substantial indication of genuine commitment to the completion of our work on the convention and a contribution to making it universal in character. We therefore invite other States to join in this voluntary exchange of data as soon as possible.

I would like to take this opportunity to make some observations on the present state of affairs in our negotiations on the convention. In many statements devoted to chemical weapons during the spring session, we have heard that the year 1990 should be a decisive one in our endeavours. We share this opinion. More than that, we consider that there are solid foundations for such an assertion. This is not only because of the favourable climate generated by the conferences in Paris and Canberra and the positive course of Soviet-American talks in this field. First and foremost, it is the progress made and material accumulated during the long years of negotiations which make the task of finalization of our efforts fully feasible.

The results accomplished by the Committee during this year's session to date under the skilful chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius also confirm that progress is possible on even the most complicated issues, providing that all parties display maximum flexibility and readiness to reach consensus. I have in mind especially the advancement of work on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. At the same time, this is just another positive example of the favourable impact of developments in the bilateral area on multilateral negotiations. Overall, however, the readiness of all parties in the negotiations to join in a common search for a mutually acceptable solution in so complex and difficult a matter has contributed to the final outcome.

Furthermore, new prospects are emerging for starting a more serious and concrete discussion on ad hoc verification. In our opinion, proper design of this verification instrument could take care of the legitimate concerns of many delegations connected with the "capability problem". In addition to efforts by the Chairman of the Committee to move our work ahead on the definite shape of challenge inspection, so competently directed previously by Ambassador Morel, it may be hoped that the general pattern of verification of the future convention will finally be worked out. An agreement on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, as well as the completion of a general pattern of verification, would create propitious conditions for resolving other difficult and still controversial issues. Use of the institution of "Friends of the Chair" seems to be the most effective form of work at this stage, allowing us to concentrate on narrowing divergent positions of delegations which attach special importance to a particular problem. I have the impression that it would be desirable to

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make greater use of smaller formal or informal groups which would be able to prepare and present to the Committee proposals on resolving outstanding issues. We hope that this form of work will rapidly bring concrete and good results.

We also appreciate the extensive discussion arranged by the Chairman of the Committee on the subject of "undiminished security". This made it possible to look at a range of political aspects of the convention in a wider environment, and particularly their interrelationship and interaction. Undoubtedly, the search for a solution has to take this broader context into account.

The first part of the 1990 session is coming to an end. As a result of a new approach by the Chairman of the Committee we have made further steps ahead on the road to the convention. We are approaching that moment in the negotiations when every participant must look more clearly at the distance already covered and that which is ahead of us in the context of the direct interests of the State he or she represents. The rights and obligations which are becoming more and more distinctly defined in the draft convention require substantive analysis from the point of view of their conformity with the political, military, economic, scientific and technological interests of each particular country.

Poland, being a country which does not possess or intend to possess chemical weapons, will naturally not have the same attitude towards such issues as the order of destruction, undiminished security, verification mechanisms and so forth as chemical weapons possessors. Our approach to the negotiations on these issues will be more general and indirect, whereas for them these issues are of direct and particular interest. On the other hand, we will have a special interest in negotiations on such issues as, for example, verification of chemical industry, assistance or co-operation. There will also be a different scale of obligations on Poland arising from our participation in the convention in comparison with "CW-capable" States.

At the same time global, regional and individual interests will become more and more visible. We will have to identify them at the right moment, single them out and seek proper compromise solutions. In our opinion, the advanced stage of negotiations on the chemical weapons convention now requires a different approach which more accurately and concretely provides opportunities to identify general - which means global - interests; particular - which means regional - interests; and individual interests. We should aim at the establishment of a mechanism for the future convention which will ensure an appropriate balance between rights and obligations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his very important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? Since that is not the case, I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider two requests for participation in its work.

The meeting was suspended at 12.40 p.m. and resumed at 12.43 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 553rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. The Conference will now proceed to take action on the note by the President, circulated by the secretariat as document CD/WP.384, concerning requests from two non-member States to participate in our work. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the decision that we have just taken, I wish to note that the statement made by the President of the Conference at the resumed 534th plenary meeting also applies to the requests that we have considered today.

I should like now to turn to another subject. The secretariat has circulated today a brief timetable for meetings to be held early next week, before we adjourn the first part of the session. As usual, the timetable is indicative and may be changed if the need arises. May I take it that the informal paper is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I have two announcements to make. I would like first of all to remind all delegations that a video film on a national trial challenge inspection conducted by the United Kingdom will be shown in room V at 3 p.m. this afternoon. I would also like to remind you that tomorrow, at 3 p.m. in this conference room, the Conference will hold an informal open-ended consultation, with amplification services, on its improved and effective functioning. In this connection, I am informed that the compilation of proposals requested from the secretariat on this subject will be available in the delegations' pigeon-holes tomorrow at noon. We look forward to a fruitful and meaningful open-ended informal consultation tomorrow afternoon.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, the last of the first part of the annual session, will be held on Tuesday, 24 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.